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Iran at a Crossroads

Iran at a Crossroads

The Islamic Republic of Iran today stands at a crossroads – democratic revolution or repression. Either the opposition topples this regime or the regime unleashes the repressive apparatus to restore its rule and in the process destroys the last remnants of popular support it might still have enjoyed. Henceforth, the Islamic Republic will either be history or it will become another military dictatorship.

There are many open questions about the leadership of the opposition and what it would do if it achieved victory in its confrontation with the regime. But there should be little doubt that, from the standpoint of Western interests, a victory for the regime is the worst possible outcome. Both morally and tactically, Western countries should  begin to implement measures to punish the regime and signal the opposition that we are on their side.

Regrettably, as 2009, President Obama’s year of engagement with Iran, gave way to 2010, diplomacy on both sides of the Atlantic was feverishly discussing a new architecture of sanctions against the Islamic Republic that merely sought to encourage the regime to change its course on the nuclear file, while stumbling on the usual obstacles: there is no guarantee that new sanctions will be supported in the UN Security Council by permanent members China and Russia; international consensus will inevitably water down the measures being currently contemplated; and it will take considerably longer to reach an agreement on the substance, as well as the goals of the new sanctions.

So far, underlying the content of various proposals being formulated and discussed in Washington and Brussels, there remains the dual track approach that characterized Western diplomacy in the past – sanctions complement incentives in order to induce a change of behavior by Iran’s regime, not undermine the regime itself.

Despite a change of tactics – from engagement to sanctions – it appears that the Obama Administration and its European allies still believe there is time to negotiate a deal over Iran’s nuclear program, and there are interlocutors inside the regime who hold enough power to deliver a deal and are accommodating enough to want one.

Transatlantic diplomacy is still wedded to the notion that sanctions, if and when they will be adopted, should aim to achieve a change of behaviour on the nuclear file by the regime, but should neither seek regime change nor engage in democracy promotion.

This is a mistake – one that America and its European allies would do well to rectify quickly.

The open challenge against the future of the Islamic Republic mounted by an increasingly defiant domestic opposition suggest that Iran today is even less amenable to persuasion than it ever was in the past – if it ever was open to compromise. The discovery of a new clandestine enrichment site near Qom shows that Iran may sooner cross the finish line in its nuclear quest. Threatened with revolution at home, the Islamic Republic is unlikely to budge on an issue on which depend the pursuit of its regional ambitions, its prestige and national pride, and ultimately its survival. It may actually elect to accelerate its nuclear efforts while upping the ante internationally – a guarantee for failure of a policy aimed at persuading the regime to change its ways. Meanwhile, the clandestine nature of much of Iran’s nuclear program’s military component and the inability of the international community to put serious obstacles on Iran’s path mean that even an expansion of UN sanctions will fail to stop Iran from achieving its goals.

A sharp change of tactics is therefore needed. If sanctions are to remain the main tool to confront Iran, America and its allies need to rethink the overall goals of their policy and adopt suitable measures to increase the likelihood of its success. In this context, Europe must play a vital role, given its thriving and privileged business relation with Iran.

This may be achieved through a dramatic escalation of pressure on Tehran with a dual aim: firstly, to strike at the most strategically sensitive sectors of Iran’s economy; and, secondly, to effectively shut off all Iranian entry points to the global economy. Admittedly, there is not a rich history of success in using sanctions to change the policies of repugnant regimes. But the goal, this time, should be to topple the regime by crippling the economy while engaging in a robust effort of public diplomacy aimed at keeping Iran’s restive population and its increasingly alienated opposition on side.

Why a new architecture of sanctions should be aimed at regime change – and therefore contain a critical component of human rights’ measures – should be clear. If Iran was a functioning, accountable, transparent democracy which treated its citizens and its neighbours with respect, its hegemonic aspirations would be an uncomfortable reality but would worry its neighbours far less. Under such circumstances, Israel and the West might privately welcome an ascendant Iran, which could conceivably become a trusted friend and ally. Proliferation is something to be avoided, but if Iran were committed to genuine democracy, its nuclear ambitions would evoke far fewer anxieties.

What matters, at this critical juncture in Iran’s revolutionary history, is that sanctions be integrated into a broader effort aimed at helping Iran’s domestic opposition to oust the regime. An architecture of sanctions that neglects the legitimate aspirations of the Iranian people, that relies on the broadest possible international consensus and that offers at the same time reassurances to the regime that its survival is not at stake is one that will only achieve one goal – buying time for the regime in its march of repression towards nuclear weapons capability.

Emanuele Ottolenghi is the author of Under a Mushroom Cloud: Europe, Iran and the Bomb (London, Profile Books: 2009). He was the director of the Brussels-based Transatlantic Institute until early 2010; from March 1, he joins the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies as a Senior Fellow.

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